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The Home Affordable Modification Program: The
Federal Circuit Court Split Leaves Mortgagors’ Rights
to Pursue State Law Claims Unclear
I. INTRODUCTION
For most people, the American Dream includes home
ownership. Due to the recent financial crisis, many Americans have
found it much harder to achieve this goal. With home foreclosures on
the rise and many Americans struggling to pay their mortgages, the
federal government created the Home Affordable Modification Program
(“HAMP”) in 2009 to slow foreclosures and help keep Americans in
their homes.1 Unfortunately, problems with interpretation and
implementation of HAMP have led to a significant amount of
litigation.2
One of the interpretative issues in HAMP is whether mortgagors
should be permitted to bring state law claims against lenders and loan
servicers for actions relating to HAMP, a federal program. Circuits are
currently split on this issue, as some courts have held that HAMP
creates no private cause of action and therefore precludes state law
claims.3 Other courts have allowed state law claims arising under facts
related to HAMP.4 This Note argues that mortgagors should be
permitted to bring certain state law claims in relation to HAMP because
doing so would help ensure that mortgage servicers comply with HAMP
directives and that mortgagors are protected against deceptive practices
in connection with HAMP modifications.
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part II explains why HAMP
1. Andrew Hawes, Forcing Lenders to Comply with the Home Affordable
Modification Program, 101 ILL. B.J. 308, 309 (2013).
2. Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 559–60 n.4 (7th Cir. 2012)
(noting that the court had analyzed over eighty federal court cases where mortgagors
brought HAMP-related claims against their mortgage servicers).
3. See id. at 555 (holding that although the allegation arose from action relating to
HAMP, mortgagors were not barred from bringing adequately pled state law claims).
4. See Miller v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 677 F.3d 1113 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that
mortgagors were barred from bringing claims because the claims were based on alleged
breaches of HAMP, a federal program which afford no private right of action).
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was instituted and the process it sets forth for a mortgagor to obtain a
permanent modification of a home mortgage.5 Part III discusses the
different approaches federal circuit courts have taken in analyzing
whether HAMP precludes state law claims.6 Part IV discusses why
circuit courts allowing state law claims relating to HAMP set a better
precedent for mortgagors seeking to enforce their servicer’s HAMP
obligations.7 Part V concludes by discussing the ramifications of
precluding state law claims and briefly recounts the claims that have
been successfully asserted in federal courts.8
II. CREATION OF THE HOME AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION PROGRAM AND
THE MODIFICATION PROCESS

A.

Purpose and Participation by Loan Servicers in HAMP

In response to the 2008 financial crisis, Congress enacted the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (“EESA”),9 which empowered
the Secretary of the Treasury (the “Treasury”) to establish certain
programs “to restore liquidity and stability” in the U.S. financial
system.10 A major portion of EESA included the Troubled Asset Relief
Program (“TARP”), which gave the Treasury authority to inject capital
into financial institutions by purchasing preferred stock in them, and to
implement a plan to help financially distressed homeowners and
minimize foreclosures.11 As part of this effort, the Treasury instituted
HAMP in 2009 to help struggling mortgagors and slow down the pace
of foreclosures.12 HAMP attempts to incentivize mortgage servicers to
offer aid to troubled mortgagors by refinancing mortgages with more
favorable interest rates and lower monthly payments.13 The Treasury
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122
Stat. 3765 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 26 U.S.C.).
10. EESA § 2, 12 U.S.C. § 5201 (2012).
11. EESA §§ 3(9), 101(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5202(9), 5211(a); Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) § 1482, 12 U.S.C. § 5219a (2012).
12. EESA § 109, 12 U.S.C. § 5219(a).
13. Federally sponsored entities Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are required to
participate in HAMP. MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE PROGRAM: HANDBOOK FOR SERVICERS
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

2015]

HAMP AND STATE LAW CLAIMS

89

set aside $50 billion to pay mortgage servicers who completed
modifications under HAMP.14 Of these funds, the Treasury has only
paid out $2.5 billion through September 2014.15
Loan servicers participate in HAMP through written Service
Participation Agreements (“SPAs”) with the Treasury.16 The terms of
these SPAs require participating servicers to identify potentially eligible
first lien mortgages for possible modification in an effort to make loan
payments more affordable through “interest rate reduction, term
extension, principal forbearance, and principal forgiveness.”17 The
participating mortgage servicers receive between $800 and $2,000 from
the Treasury for every permanent modification entered into, as well as
other incentives.18
B.

Mortgagor Requirements for HAMP Eligibility

A mortgagor is eligible for HAMP if he meets certain basic
requirements detailed in the HAMP guidelines.19 To be eligible for
HAMP, the following requirements must be met: (1) the mortgage loan
must be a first lien mortgage originated on or before January 1, 2009;20
(2) the mortgagor must be able to show documented financial hardship
and that he does not have sufficient liquid assets to make the current
monthly mortgage payments;21 (3) the current unpaid principal balance
must be below the program limit of $729,750 for a single family
home;22 (4) the mortgagor must have submitted an Initial Package
requesting a modification on or before December 31, 2015; (5) and the

OF NON-GSE

MORTGAGES 13 (Ver. 4.4, March 3, 2014) [hereinafter HAMP HANDBOOK],
available
at
https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/docs/hamp_servicer/mhahandbook_41.pdf
14. Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 556 (7th Cir. 2012).
15. SPEC. INSPECT. GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, QUARTERLY
REPORT TO CONGRESS
431
(Oct.
29,
2014),
available
at
http://www.sigtarp.gov/Quarterly%20Reports/October_29_2014_Report_to_Congress.pdf.
16. HAMP HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 23.
17. Id. at 15.
18. Id. at 144. Other monetary incentives are detailed in the HAMP Handbook. Id. at
143–45.
19. Id. at 72.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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Modification Effective Date is on or before September 30, 2016.23
In addition to these requirements, default on the mortgage must
be reasonably foreseeable, the mortgage must be delinquent, or the
mortgage must be in foreclosure.24 Regardless of the status, the
mortgage must be secured by a single family property which is occupied
by the mortgagor as his primary place of residence.25 Furthermore, the
mortgagor’s monthly payment prior to the modification must have been
more than 31% of his verified gross monthly income.26 Finally, the loan
must not have been previously modified through the HAMP program.27
C.

The HAMP Modification Process

If a mortgagor meets the program requirements, the loan
servicer will calculate a modification payment amount using a
“waterfall” approach.28 This approach requires the loan servicer to
apply changes to the repayment requirements in a specific order until
the modified payment is as close as possible to 31% of the mortgagor’s
gross monthly income.29 To reach this 31%, first the loan is capitalized;
second, the interest rate is reduced; third, the loan term is extended; and
fourth, if necessary, the loan is placed into principal forbearance.30
Once a loan has met the threshold requirements and a modified
payment amount has been determined through the waterfall method, the
loan servicer will perform a net present value (“NPV”) test.31 This test
compares the NPV of the mortgage to the NPV of the same mortgage if
it were modified under HAMP.32 If the NPV with a modification is
greater than the NPV without a modification, the result is deemed
23. The Initial Package is the required forms that must be sent to the loan servicers,
and includes: a Request for Mortgage Assistance form; IRS form 4506-T or 4506T-EZ or
the mortgagor’s most recent tax return; evidence of income; and Dodd-Frank certification.
Id. at 83.
24. Id. at 74.
25. Id. at 73.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 111.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 111–12. Capitalization is the addition of accrued interest and other advances
to the principal of the loan. Id. Principal forbearance is a deferral of a portion of the
principal until the end of loan. Id.
31. Id. at 122.
32. Id.
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“positive.”33 Conversely, if the NPV with a modification is less than the
NPV without a modification, the result is deemed “negative.”34 A loan
that has a positive NPV must be offered a Trial Plan Period (“TPP”).35
A loan that has a negative NPV is not required to be offered TPP, but
the lender may elect to do so.36
If a mortgagor is offered a TPP, it must last a minimum of three
months.37 Additionally, the new monthly payment must be set at 31%
of the mortgagor’s gross monthly income derived through the waterfall
method.38 Borrowers who make all TPP payments on time and meet all
other requirements “will be offered a permanent modification.”39
The process described above applies to Tier 1 HAMP
modifications.40 In 2012, HAMP was expanded to include loans that
did not qualify under Tier 1, and Tier 2 HAMP modifications were
created.41 The Tier 2 modification process is practically identical to that
of Tier 1, but extends modifications to a greater number of mortgages
previously ineligible for HAMP.42 All loans and modifications
discussed in this Note relate to Tier 1 HAMP Modifications.43
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER STATE LAW CLAIMS RELATING TO HAMP
All the federal courts agree that HAMP does not create a private
right of action under federal law, and no claim can be made for
violations of HAMP.44 Federal courts split, however, on whether state

33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 126.
38. Id. at 127.
39. Id. at 126. The HAMP Handbook uses the language “will be offered a permanent

modification,” and this wording is the source of much of the litigation. Id.
40. Id. at 72–126.
41. Id. at 73 n.2.
42. See id. at 73. Tier 2 modifications apply to a broader range of mortgages,
including rental properties and loans that have previously been in HAMP, but fell out of
good standing. Id.
43. See infra Part III.
44. See Miller v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 677 F.3d 1113, 1116 (11th Cir. 2012) (stating
that HAMP does not create a private right of action); Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673
F.3d 547, 555 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating that HAMP and its enabling statute do not contain a
federal right of action).
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law claims are thereby precluded.45
A.

Federal Courts Finding State Law Claims Relating to HAMP
Precluded

The United States Courts of Appeals for the Eleventh and Fifth
Circuits have held that because HAMP does not create a private right of
action under federal law, mortgagors are barred from bringing claims
against lenders for violations relating to HAMP under state law.46
In Miller v. Chase Home Finance, LLC,47 the Eleventh Circuit
rejected the mortgagor’s state law claims.48 The mortgagor, Miller,
requested a loan modification pursuant to HAMP and the lender, Chase,
agreed to a temporary modification of the loan.49 After going through
the HAMP process and successfully completing the TPP, Chase
informed Miller that it would not extend a permanent modification.50
After Miller received this notification, he filed suit against Chase for
failure to comply with its obligation under HAMP.51 Miller brought suit
“for (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, and (3) promissory estoppel.”52 He filed suit in
federal court based on diversity of citizenship and amount in
controversy pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.53
In rejecting the state law claims pled in Miller, the Eleventh
Circuit held that there was no private right of action under HAMP.54
Although the court acknowledged that there is no express private right
of action, it stated that the court had never analyzed whether an implied
45. See Miller, 677 F.3d at 1117 (rejecting state law claims because they are premised
on obligations under HAMP). But see Wigod, 673 F.3d at 555 (establishing that although
HAMP does not create a private right of action, it does not preempt viable state law claims).
46. See Miller, 677 F.3d at 1117 (holding that state law claims are based on—and not
independent of—HAMP, which affords no private right of action); see also Opinion and
Order at 8, Vida v. OneWest Bank, F.S.B., Civ. 10-987-AC, 2010 WL 5148473, at *5 (D.
Or. Dec. 13, 2010) (holding state law claims are too closely tied to HAMP to be
independent of HAMP which affords no private right of action).
47. 677 F.3d 1113 (11th Cir. 2012).
48. Id. at 1117 (holding that state law claims may not be brought).
49. Id. at 1115.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Complaint at 2, Miller v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, No. 2:10-CV-0206 (N.D. Ga.
Oct. 6, 2011).
54. Miller v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 677 F.3d 1113, 1116 (11th Cir. 2012).
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private right of action existed.55 In concluding that there is no such
implied right under HAMP, the court applied the “implied private right
of action test.”56 This test examines four factors: (1) whether the
plaintiff is a member of the class for whose especial benefit the law was
created; (2) whether there is legislative intent to create or deny a
remedy; (3) whether a private right of action is consistent with the
purpose for enacting the law; and (4) whether the right of action is
traditionally one of state law, and therefore improper to infer a private
right of action due to the federal law.57 The court found that HAMP
was enacted not for the benefit of mortgagors, but to allow the Treasury
to stabilize the financial markets.58 The court also noted that it found no
legislative intent to create any private right of action.59 Next, the court
stated that allowing mortgagors to bring these claims would conflict
with the HAMP’s purpose, which is to incentivize mortgage servicers to
modify distressed mortgages.60 Finally, the court noted that contract
and property law are traditionally areas of law left to the states.61
Having found that no private right of action exists under HAMP,
the court held that Miller lacked standing to bring state law claims
arising from his mortgage servicer’s obligations under HAMP.62
Accordingly, because all of Miller’s claims were based on violations of
his servicer’s HAMP obligations, the court dismissed them.63
The Fifth Circuit rejected similar HAMP claims on different
grounds.64 In Pennington v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A.,65 the Fifth Circuit
rejected the theory that a TPP creates a contract under which state law
claims may be brought.66 The Fifth Circuit acknowledged the approach
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc. v. Johannesburg Consol. Invs., 553 F.3d
1351, 1362 n.14 (11th Cir. 2008)).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1116–17.
63. See id. at 1117. Interestingly, the court analyzed the sufficiency of Miller’s claims
under state law and determined that they would still be dismissed even if HAMP provided
Miller with adequate standing. Id.
64. See Pennington v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 493 F. App’x 548 (5th Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 133 U.S. 1272 (2013).
65. Id. at 551–53.
66. See id. at 553–55 (holding that no contract exists because the mortgage servicer
expresses no intent to be bound until a permanent modification is signed).
55.
56.
57.
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taken in Miller, but opted to go a different route, stating that the TPP is
not a contract because the bank expressed no intent to be bound by it.67
On this rationale, the court dismissed the claims for breach of contract
of both the TPP and the Modification Agreement.68 The court also
dismissed the remaining claims for insufficient pleadings.69
B.

Federal Courts Allowing State Law Claims Related to HAMP

In contrast to the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, the Seventh,
Ninth, First, and Fourth Circuits have allowed certain adequately pled
state law claims to proceed, even though they are based on actions
arising under HAMP.70
In Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,71 the Seventh Circuit
allowed some of the mortgagor’s state law claims to proceed.72 In 2009,
the mortgager, Wigod, was in financial distress and unable to pay her
current mortgage payment.73 Wigod requested a modification pursuant
to HAMP and submitted all the proper paperwork.74 The lender, Wells
Fargo, determined that Wigod was eligible for a HAMP modification
and began a TPP for her loan.75 Wigod complied with her obligations
under the TPP and made all the requisite payments,76 but upon
completion of the TPP, Wells Fargo refused to offer Wigod a permanent
modification.77 Wigod filed suit against Wells Fargo, alleging state law
claims including breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and violations
of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act
67. See id. (rejecting the position that the TPP constitutes a contract, the Fifth Circuit
declined to follow the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Wigod).
68. See id.
69. See id. at 556–57 (dismissing claims for negligent misrepresentation and
promissory estoppel for failure to plead a claim for which relief can be granted).
70. See, e.g., Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 717 F.3d 224, 235 (1st Cir. 2013)
(holding that plaintiff had adequately pled a breach of contract claim from facts arising
under HAMP); Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 559–60 n.4 (7th Cir. 2012)
(holding that federal law does not preclude adequately pled state law claims from being
brought even if the claims are based on actions arising under HAMP, which does not
provide a private cause of action).
71. 673 F.3d 547.
72. Id. at 559 n.4.
73. Id. at 557–58.
74. Id. at 558.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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(“ICFA”).78
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that HAMP and its enabling
statute did not create a private right of action, but concluded that this
did not bar mortgagors from bringing adequately pled state law claims
against mortgage servicers for actions relating to HAMP.79 In reaching
this conclusion, the Wigod court reviewed over eighty federal cases
where mortgagors attempted to bring claims against their mortgage
servicers for actions relating to HAMP.80 The court identified three
legal theories attempted by plaintiffs in these actions.81 The first theory
was to bring claims arising under HAMP and its enabling statutes.82
However, the Wigod court found that this private right of action theory
had been universally rejected by all other federal courts.83 The second
theory attempted to claim that mortgagors were third-party beneficiaries
of the SPAs negotiated between the mortgage servicers and the
Treasury.84 The court noted that the vast majority of courts that
considered this claim had rejected it, finding that the mortgagors were
not intended beneficiaries of the SPAs.85 The third theory based the
claims on the TPP agreements between the mortgagors and the
mortgage servicers.86 This theory has been used by some courts to
allow mortgagors to bring contract claims, tort claims, and consumer
fraud statute violations against their mortgage servicers by basing these
claims directly on the TPP agreements.87 The TPP agreements place the
mortgagors in direct privity with their mortgage servicers, eliminating
the third party issue that caused the second theory to fail.88
Accepting the TPP claim based theory, the court then analyzed
each of Wigod’s state law claims and found that she had adequately
78. Id. at 555. Wigod attempted to bring her case as a class action pursuant to 28
U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(2) (West 2013), but the district court noted she had diversity of
citizenship pursuant to § 1332(a), and it opted not to delve into the class action issue.
Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 10-CV-2348, 2011 WL 250501, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan.
25, 2011).
79. Wigod, 673 F.3d at 559.
80. Id. at 559–60 n.4.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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pled breach of contract, promissory estoppel, fraudulent
it
misrepresentations, and violations of ICFA claims.89 Once
determined that certain state law claims had been adequately pled, the
court analyzed whether these claims were preempted by federal law.90
The court determined that no theory of preemption prevented
mortgagors from bringing adequately pled state law claims against
mortgagor servicers for actions relating to HAMP.91 Express
preemption was conceded by the parties, so the court did not analyze the
topic.92 In rejecting field preemption, the court disagreed with Wells
Fargo’s claim that the Home Owners’ Loan Act93 (“HOLA”) occupied
the relevant field.94 The court rejected this theory based on its
interpretation of the relevant statutes and precedent.95 The court also
rejected Wells Fargo’s claims of conflict preemption based on the
argument that allowing state law claims would be an obstacle to Wells
Fargo’s participation in HAMP.96 The court rejected this claim based
on precedent, the fact that Congress did not intend to foreclose all suits
against mortgage servicers, and the fact that the HAMP guidelines
require that HAMP be implemented in compliance with state law.97
After clarifying that state law claims are not preempted, the
court addressed what it called the “end-run” theory.98 Wells Fargo
argued that Wigod’s claims were simply “HAMP claims in disguise,”99
and were an attempt to dodge the fact that HAMP did not provide for a
private cause of action.100 The court found no support for this claim,
and stated that it is remarkably similar to conflict preemption.101 The
court also cited cases in which a federal statute that provides no right of
89. Id. at 560–74 (rejecting claims of negligent hiring or supervision, negligent
misrepresentations and concealment, and fraudulent concealment).
90. Id. at 576.
91. Id. at 576–81; see infra notes 136–54 and accompanying text.
92. Wigod, 673 F.3d at 576.
93. Home Owners’ Loan Act (HOLA), ch. 64, 124 Stat. 128 (1933).
94. Id. at 576–77.
95. Id. (citing In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Mortg. Servicing Litig., 491 F.3d 638
(7th Cir. 2007)).
96. Id. at 577–78.
97. See id. at 577–81 (holding that conflict preemption was inconsistent with the
Seventh Circuit’s opinion in In re Ocwen Loan Servicing)
98. Id. at 581.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 581–85.

2015]

HAMP AND STATE LAW CLAIMS

97

action does not preclude state law claims.102
In Corvello v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,103 the Ninth Circuit
extended the reasoning in Wigod when it held that mortgage servicers
are contractually required to offer a permanent modification to
mortgagors who successfully complete a TPP.104 Like Wigod, Corvello
was a financially distressed mortgagor who sought a modification
pursuant to HAMP and entered into a TPP with his servicer, Wells
Fargo, but upon successful completion, was not offered a permanent
modification.105 Based on diversity of citizenship, Corvello filed claims
in federal court for breach of contract, “promissory estoppel, breaches
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violations of
California’s Unfair Competition Law.”106 Similar to the ruling in
Wigod, the Ninth Circuit held that the TPP creates a contract under
which state law claims could be brought.107 Corvello extended the
reasoning in Wigod to find a contractual relationship even if the servicer
did not receive a signed copy of the TPP, as was the case in Wigod.108
The First Circuit allowed state law claims in relation to HAMP
in Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.109 Young’s facts are very similar to
other HAMP-related cases.110 Young, the mortgagor, was financially
distressed and applied for a HAMP modification.111 After successfully
completing the TPP, Young was not offered a permanent
modification.112 Young filed suit in Massachusetts state court and
Wells Fargo removed the case to the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts.113 In her complaint, Young alleged breach of
contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligent
and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and unfair debt

102. Id. at 581 (citing Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005)).
103. 728 F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 2013).
104. Id. at 880.
105. Id. at 884.
106. Id. at 882.
107. Id. at 884.
108. Id.
109. 717 F.3d 224 (1st Cir. 2013).
110. See, e.g., Miller v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, 677 F.3d 1113, 1115–117 (11th Cir.

2012); Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 557–59 (7th Cir. 2012).
111. Young, 717 F.3d at 230.
112. Id.
113. Notice of Removal at 1, Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 1:11-CV-10757,
2011 WL 7943923 (D. Mass. May 2, 2011).
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collection practices in violation of Massachusetts state law.114 The First
Circuit allowed the claims for breach of contract and unfair debt
collection practices to proceed.115
The court in Young did not specifically address whether
HAMP’s lack of a private right of action bars state law claims.116 The
court addressed each of Young’s claims and determined she adequately
pled a claim for breach of contract and unfair debt collection practices
in violation of Massachusetts law.117 Although the court never
addressed the issue of whether HAMP precluded state law claims, it
allowed a breach of contract claim based on the TPP, an integral part of
the HAMP modification process.118
The Fourth Circuit may be open to following Wigod’s path.119
In Spaulding v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,120 the Fourth Circuit noted that
state law claims related to HAMP are not necessarily precluded simply
because HAMP creates no private right of action.121 The Spaulding
court dismissed all the claims, but based its dismissal on the fact that the
mortgagors had never entered into a TPP agreement with their mortgage
servicer.122
When courts have allowed state law claims for actions relating
to HAMP, they generally fall under contract claims, alternative contract
theories such as promissory estoppel, and consumer fraud protection
laws.123 These courts base the breach of contract claims on the theory
that the TPP agreement between the mortgagor and the mortgage
114.
115.
116.

Young, 717 F.3d at 228.
Id. at 242.
See id. at 236 n.10 (stating that the district court dismissed Count II because
HAMP provides no private right of action, and since Young does not challenge that ruling,
the First Circuit will not pass on the merits).
117. See id. at 236, 242 (holding that Young adequately pled a violation of MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 93A (2014), which provides a cause of action for those injured by unfair or
deceptive acts or practices).
118. Id. at 235–36.
119. See Spaulding v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., 714 F.3d 769, 776–77 n.4 (4th Cir. 2013)
(citing Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 581 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The absence
of a private right of action from a federal statute provides no reason to dismiss a claim under
a state law just because it refers to or incorporates some element of the federal law.”).
120. 714 F.3d 769.
121. Id. at 776–77 n.4 (citing Wigod, 673 F.3d at 581).
122. Id. at 775.
123. See Wigod, 673 F.3d at 559–60 n.4 (allowing claims for breach of contract,
promissory estoppel, and the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices
Act); see also Young, 717 F.3d at 235 (holding that plaintiff had adequately pled a breach of
contract claim and MASS. GEN. LAW ch. 93A).

2015]

HAMP AND STATE LAW CLAIMS

99

servicer created a contract.124 The consumer protection law claim in
Wigod was based solely on actions relating to the TPP.125 Young
allowed a similar claim on actions based on the TPP, but the claim also
involved certain actions of Wells Fargo that extended beyond the TPP
to actions related to notices that she was in arrears and a forbearance
agreement that occurred over a year before she began the HAMP
process.126
C.

Federal Courts That Have Side-stepped the HAMP Issue

In Cox v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.,127 the
Eighth Circuit declined to address whether HAMP’s failure to provide a
private cause of action precluded adequately pled state law claims.128
This case arose when the mortgagor, Cox, found himself in financial
distress and attempted to modify his mortgage payment through
HAMP.129 After successfully completing the TPP, Cox was not offered
a permanent modification.130 Cox filed suit in Minnesota state court,
and Mortgage Electronic Registration Services removed it to the United
States District Court for the District of Minnesota based on diversity of
citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.131 Cox alleged certain state
law claims, and the district court dismissed all the claims due to the fact
that “HAMP creates no private right of action” and the claims were
premised on HAMP obligations.132 In the alternative, the district court
would have dismissed the claims for failure to state a claim.133
In its review of the district court decision, the Eighth Circuit
noted that it would not address the issue of whether HAMP precluded
adequately pled state law claims because Cox had not adequately pled

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Wigod, 673 F.3d at 559–60 n.4; Young, 717 F.3d at 235.
Wigod, 673 F.3d at 574–76.
Young, 717 F.3d at 240–42.
685 F.3d 663 (8th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 675 n.4.
Id. at 667.
Id.
Notice of Removal at 2, Cox v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 794 F. Supp.
2d 1060 (D. Minn. 2010) (No. 0:10-CV-04626).
132. Cox, 685 F.3d at 667–68.
133. Id. at 668 (noting that the district court held in the alternative that Cox had not met
the federal pleading standard for his claims under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007)).
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his state law claims.134 The Eighth Circuit upheld the dismissal of all
Cox’s state law claims for reasons independent of their connection to
HAMP, purposefully declining to decide the issue.135
IV. MORTGAGORS’ STATE LAW CLAIMS RELATING TO HAMP SHOULD
BE PERMITTED

A.

HAMP Should Not Preempt Adequately Pled State Law Claims

State law claims relating to HAMP have raised preemption
concerns.136 The Constitution provides that federal law has supremacy
over state law.137 In order for federal law to preempt state law,
preemption must be the “clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”138
Preemption occurs in one of three ways: (1) express preemption, (2)
field preemption, or (3) conflict preemption.139
Express preemption occurs when a federal law expressly states
that the particular federal statute trumps state and local laws.140
Nowhere in the HAMP enabling statute is there a clear statement of
preemption over state laws, and therefore no express preemption
exists.141 The lack of express preemption is so prominent that the
Wigod court barely touched on the topic in its detailed preemption
analysis.142
134.
135.

Id. at 675 n.4.
See id. (dismissing all the claims for failure to sufficiently plead “sufficient factual
matter accepted as true, to state a plausible claim on its face.”) The court dismissed Count I
requesting an accounting of the lender’s activities in relation to the loan stating that if any
other claim was viable, discovery would be adequate to make the sought after information
available. Id. The court dismissed Count II pertaining to the fairness of a lender purchasing
a home it foreclosed on because the complaint did not make allegations in relation to the
sale. Id. They further dismissed the count for breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing because the mortgagor did not plead sufficient facts for such a claim. Id. The court
also dismissed claims of misrepresentation because the mortgagor did not plead reliance, a
necessary element. Id.
136. See Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 576–81 (7th Cir. 2012)
(analyzing whether HAMP preempts state law claims).
137. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
138. Wigod, 673 F.3d at 576 (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009)).
139. Arsen Sarapinian, Fighting Foreclosure: Using Contract Law to Enforce the Home
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), 64 Hastings L.J. 905, 921 (2013).
140. Id. (citing FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 56–57 (1990)).
141. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5201, 5219(a) (2012); see HAMP HANDBOOK, supra note 13.
142. Wigod, 673 F.3d at 576–77.
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Field preemption occurs when “federal law so thoroughly
occupies a legislative field ‘as to make reasonable the inference that
Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.’ ”143 Field
preemption should not apply to state law claims implicating actions
related to HAMP because HAMP does not apply to all home
modifications, but only those that meet HAMP’s strict requirements.144
Loan modifications occurred before HAMP was enacted, and the
HAMP guidelines do not cover every mortgagor that seeks
modification. This should eliminate the possibility of field preemption
precluding state law claims relating to HAMP. The court in Wigod
reached the same conclusion, and rejected Wells Fargo’s argument that
HOLA and the Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”) regulations occupy
the relevant field.145 In doing so, the court pointed to a provision of the
OTS regulations that explains certain state law claims, including
contract claims, are not preempted if they only have incidental effects
on lending operations.146 The court also noted that the position taken by
Wells Fargo is in direct conflict with the precedent set by the Seventh
Circuit.147 In In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Mortg. Servicing
Litig.,148 the Seventh Circuit held that HOLA did not create a private
right of action, but this did not preempt state common law claims by
those harmed by wrongful acts of their savings and loan associations.149
Conflict preemption occurs when “(1) ‘it is impossible for a
private party to comply with both state and federal requirements,’ or (2)
‘where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’ ”150 The
Id. at 576 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)).
HAMP HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 68 (describing the requirements that must be
met to qualify for a HAMP modification).
145. Wigod, 673 F.3d at 576–77. Wells Fargo attempted to rely on HOLA, a statute
enacted to provide relief from the massive amount of home loan defaults during the Great
Depression. Id. (citing Home Owners’ Loan Act (HOLA), ch. 64, §§ 4(a), 5(a), 124 Stat.
128, 129, 132 (1933) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1463(a), 1464(a) (West
2013)). HOLA gave the OTS authority to create and regulate savings associations. HOLA
§§4(a), 5(a), 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1463(a), 1464(a). Wells Fargo attempted to rely on OTS
regulation that stated it “occupies the entire field of federal regulation for federal savings
associations.” Wigod, 673 F.3d at 576–77. (citing 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) (2014)).
146. Wigod, 673 F.3d at 577.
147. Id. (citing In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Mortg. Servicing Litig., 491 F.3d
638, 643 (7th Cir. 2007)).
148. 491 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2007).
149. Id. at 643.
150. Wigod, 673 F.3d at 578 (quoting Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287
143.
144.
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HAMP guidelines state that implementation of the program by
mortgage servicers must be in compliance with all laws, including state
laws.151 This provision contradicts the idea that HAMP preempts state
law claims because of a conflict.152 Compliance with state law would
include statutes and common law and leads to the conclusion that if
these laws are violated, the courts may provide a remedy.153 In Wigod,
Wells Fargo unsuccessfully argued that state law claims presented an
obstacle to their accomplishment and execution of HAMP.154
Allowing state law claims would not conflict with the
implementation of HAMP, but rather ensure loan servicers compliance
with the program. The HAMP guidelines lay out detailed steps loan
servicers must follow in the modification process.155 State law claims
would only be brought if a mortgagor believes his loan servicer has
violated the servicer’s HAMP obligations, further ensuring compliance,
not creating an obstacle to HAMP implementation. Wigod reached the
same conclusion, and rejected this argument because it contradicted the
precedent set in In re Ocwen that state common law claims are
complementary to HOLA.156
Furthermore, allowing state law claims would not contradict the
Congress’ purpose in enacting HAMP.157 Allowing such claims would
not impose additional duties on mortgage servicers, it would not open
mortgage servicers to multiple standards of conduct, nor would it
conflict with the intent of Congress.158 Wigod acknowledged that
allowing state claims may decrease servicer participation in HAMP.159
Servicer participation in HAMP was almost certainly a goal of
Congress, but another goal was to prevent banks from taking advantage
of mortgagors in financial difficulty.160 Nothing in HAMP leads to the
conclusion that servicer participation should be more important than
(1995)).
151. Id. at 581.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 580.
154. Id. at 578.
155. HAMP HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 104–18.
156. In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Mortg. Servicing Litig., 491 F.3d 638, 643 (7th
Cir. 2007).
157. Wigod, 673 F.3d at 579–81.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 580.
160. Id. at 581.
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servicer compliance with their obligations under HAMP.161
Nevertheless, federal courts are still reluctant to allow state law
claims in relation to HAMP due to preemption issues.162 However, the
preemption doctrine is not implicated in these cases because these state
common law claims are not interfering with, nor are they contrary to,
the federal program; they are simply a means by which mortgagors who
have been wronged may seek justice.163
B.

Lack of a Private Right of Action in a Federal Statute Should
Not Equate to Dismissal of State Law Claims

Federal courts have previously allowed state law claims
implicating federal laws and statutes when the federal statute creates no
private right of action.164 For example, the Seventh Circuit discussed
how the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”)
does not create a federal cause of action for farmers who are injured
from these products due to manufacturer violations of the act, but the
courts have allowed these injured farmers to bring state law claims.165
In relation to FIFRA, the Supreme Court held that state common law
claims are not preempted because they are consistent with and do not
conflict with FIFRA.166 So long as the state law claims do not create or
add requirements to the federal statute, they should be allowed to move
forward.167
Similarly, HOLA is a federal statute that has been enforced
through state law claims.168 HOLA has no private right of action, but
this has not prevented the courts from allowing injured parties to bring
state law claims to enforce its provisions.169 In In re Ocwen, the
Seventh Circuit held that state law claims for breach of contract and

Id.
Sarapinian, supra note 139, at 921.
See Wigod, 673 F.3d at 576–81 (analyzing and dismissing preemption issues in
relation to state law claims brought from actions arising under HAMP).
164. Id. at 581 (citing Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 448 (2005));
Sarapinian, supra note 139, at 926 (citing In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Mortg.
Servicing Litig., 491 F.3d 638, 643 (7th Cir. 2007)).
165. Wigod, 673 F.3d at 581 (citing Bates, 544 U.S. at 448).
166. Sarapinian, supra note 139, at 928 (citing Bates, 544 U.S. at 447).
167. Id.
168. Id. (citing In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, 491 F.3d at 643).
169. Id.
161.
162.
163.
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fraudulent misrepresentation are enforceable in relation to HOLA and
will complement the federal statute.170 In relation to state law claims
relating to HOLA, the Seventh Circuit noted that it would be surprising
if a federal statute or regulatory scheme prevented state law claims for
violation of state laws.171
The Wigod court noted that when federal jurisdiction is invoked
due to diversity of citizenship, the lack of a private cause of action
should actually be considered as a factor against dismissing the state
law claims.172 Under the reasoning used in cases implicating FIRFA
and HOLA, where neither federal statute created a private cause of
action, adequately pled state law claims should be permitted even
though they relate to HAMP.173
C.

Precluding State Law Claims Negatively Impacts Mortgagors
and Favors Deceptive Practices by Mortgage Servicers

HAMP was instituted to slow down foreclosures and assist
financially distressed homeowners by granting mortgagors a permanent
modification of the mortgage.174 Regardless of this goal, many eligible
homeowners who have qualified for HAMP or successfully completed a
TPP have not received these modifications.175 Some loan servicers have
used deceptive tactics to avoid granting eligible mortgagors permanent
modifications.176 In a class action lawsuit, Bank of America employees
testified that they lied to mortgagors seeking modification, denied
modification for fictitious reasons, and received rewards for denying
distressed mortgagors modifications.177 Bank of America employees

170.
171.

In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, 491 F.3d at 643–44.
Sarapinian, supra note 139, at 926 (quoting In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, 491 F.3d

at 643).
172. Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 582 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Wyeth
v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 574 (2009)).
173. Sarapinian, supra note 139, at 926.
174. Hawes, supra note 1, at 309.
175. Id.
176. Cushla E. Talbut, HAMPered Hope for Homeowners: An Analysis of How
Litigation Trends Have Exposed the Home Affordable Modification Program’s Weakness,
68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 295, 296 (2013).
177. Id. (citing Paul Kiel, Bank of America Lied to Homeowners and Rewarded
Foreclosures,
Former
Employees
Say,
ProPublica
(June
2014),
http://www.propublica.org/article/bank-of-america-lied-to-homeowners-and-rewardedforeclosures).
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have admitted to engaging in deceptive practices and rejecting qualified
mortgagors from receiving permanent modification under HAMP,178
and similar allegations have been made in many other cases attempting
to seek redress for actions related to HAMP.179
To fight their servicers’ deceptive actions and failure to comply
with servicer obligations under HAMP, some homeowners have turned
to the courts.180 In Wigod, the Seventh Circuit found that Wigod
successfully pled all the requirements for a claim for violations of the
Illinois Consumer Fraud and Protection Act (“ICFA”) and allowed the
claim to survive a motion to dismiss.181 The specifics of the complaint
are not detailed in the opinion but Wigod alleged “that Wells Fargo
dishonestly and ineffectually implemented HAMP.”182
The Wigod decision represents a victory for mortgagors seeking
to end deceptive and fraudulent practices by their mortgage servicers
when it comes to HAMP modifications.183 Unfortunately, some courts
have found ways to distinguish Wigod.184 These courts have held that
the contract between the mortgagor and servicer is not complete until
the permanent modification is signed by the mortgage servicer.185 Other
courts have distinguished Wigod through differences in the language of
the TPP agreements.186 In Cave v. Saxon Mortgage Services, Inc.,187 the
court distinguished the TPP from that in Wigod based on language that
stated the servicer will determine qualification for a permanent
modification after completion of the TPP.188 The HAMP Guidelines do
not require servicers to use specific language in the TPP, but simply
states “[t]he TPP notice describes the terms and conditions of the trial
period and sets forth the required payment due dates.”189 The courts
Id.
See, e.g., Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 574 (7th Cir. 2012)
(alleging deceptive and unfair practice by Wells Fargo against Wigod in the handling of her
HAMP modification); Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 717 F.3d 224, 240–42 (1st Cir.
2013) (claiming Wells Fargo engaged in unfair and deceptive practices).
180. Hawes, supra note 1, at 309.
181. Wigod, 673 F.3d at 574–76.
182. Id. at 574.
183. Hawes, supra note 1, at 310.
184. Id. at 312.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. No. 11-4586, 2012 WL 1957588 at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 30, 2012).
188. Id. at *4–5.
189. HAMP HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 126.
178.
179.
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that have distinguished Wigod are leaving financially distressed
mortgagors open to potentially deceptive practices by their mortgage
servicer when seeking a HAMP modification.190
V. CONCLUSION
Many mortgagors are attempting to bring state law claims
against their lenders in relation to HAMP modification, more
specifically through the TPP and other representations made during the
modification process.191 Although these claims undoubtedly arise from
actions relating to HAMP, which does not create a private right of
action, state law claims provide mortgagors a remedy if lenders treat
mortgagors unfairly in relation to their HAMP duties.192
Without access to the court system, mortgagors are left with no
remedy for the actions of their lenders that violate HAMP. It is clear
from the amount of litigation that mortgagors believe they are being
treated unfairly, and that their lenders and mortgage servicers do not
always fully comply with the HAMP mandates. Because courts have
unanimously held that HAMP creates no private right of action,193
without the ability to assert state law claims, mortgagors are left at the
mercy of their lenders. Denying access to the courts keeps the door
open to the possibility of deceptive practices.
Furthermore, precluding state law claims will allow lenders and
mortgage servicers to go unpunished for violating their HAMP
obligations and engaging in deceptive practices in denying homeowners
permanent modifications. If mortgagors cannot seek redress under
HAMP or through state law claims, there is no incentive for the
mortgage servicers to comply with the HAMP guidelines or dissuade
them from engaging in further deceptive practices with respect to

Talbut, supra note 176, at 315.
See, e.g., Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 560 (7th Cir. 2012)
(bringing action for breach of contract in relation to TPP and representations made during
the HAMP modification process); see also Bosque v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 762 F. Supp.
2d 342, 351 (D. Mass. May 2, 2011) (bringing breach of contract claim in relation to TPP).
192. See Bosque, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 351 (holding that if the TPP or representations
made during the HAMP modification process can be seen as a contract, plaintiffs must have
standing to bring state breach of contract claims).
193. See, e.g., Miller v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 677 F.3d 1113, 1117 (11th Cir. 2012)
(stating HAMP does not create a private right of action); Wigod, 673 F.3d at 555 (stating
HAMP and its enabling statute do not contain a federal right of action).
190.
191.
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HAMP modifications.
Breach of contract and quasi-contract claims, such as
promissory estoppel, have had the most success at surviving in federal
courts.194 State law claims alleging fraud and violation of state
consumer protection laws have also seen some success.195 Many of
these state law claims are appearing in federal courts based on diversity
of citizenship and amount in controversy.196 Others are getting into
federal court through class action and multi-district litigation.197
The HAMP Guidelines state that mortgagors who successfully
comply with all the TPP requirements “will be offered a permanent
modification.”198 It is this mandatory language that mortgagors are
relying on. Federal courts should follow Wigod and Young, and allow
adequately pled state law claims to proceed to ensure that mortgage
servicers are not deceiving mortgagors and are following through with
their HAMP obligations.199
CHRISTOPHER J. DISANTO

194. See Wigod, 673 F.3d at 566 (allowing alternative claim of promissory estoppel in
relation to HAMP).
195. See id. at 559 n.4 (allowing claim for violation the Illinois Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Business Practices Act); Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 717 F.3d 224, 235
(1st Cir. 2013) (holding that plaintiff had adequately pled violation of MASS. GEN. LAW ch.
93A (2014)).
196. See e.g., Complaint at 2, Miller v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, (N.D. Ga. Oct. 6, 2011)
(No. 2:10-CV-0206) (claiming diversity of citizenship in complaint); Notice of Removal at
1, Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 1:11-CV-10757 (D. Mass. May 2, 2011)
(removing case from state court to federal court based on diversity of citizenship).
197. Benjamin B. Klubes et al., HAMP Risk on the Rise: A Complicated Regulatory
Scheme Under the Spotlight, 100 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 23, 1017, 1019 (June 4, 2013).
198. HAMP HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 126.
199. See Talbut, supra note 176, at 315 (stating that courts that distinguish Wigod leaves
mortgagors in “HAMP hell”).

